

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Counselor and Chairman

Policy Planning Council

Washington

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 24, 1962

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
FROM: W. W. Rostow
SUBJECT: Report Number One of Planning Subcommittee.

1. As of this morning the planning exercise is inaugurated.

2. We suggest that the following decisions by the Executive Committee of the NSC may be urgent:

a. Press and diplomatic guidance on turning back of certain Soviet ships. It seems essential that no one throw his hat in the air at this point. It may be merely buying time to set up a more serious military confrontation; and, in any case, it leaves open the question of the capabilities still on the island.

b. The issue of taking out the missiles and installations already in Cuba increases in urgency. The Soviets may try to deflate the present crisis quickly and settle for what is in the island and what they can subsequently deliver by clandestine means. If we are going to act, we should consider acting very soon. Harry Rowen is in charge of work at the Pentagon on alternative methods. The Executive Committee may wish to review those alternative methods today.

c. If the ships do turn back, a prompt, quiet approach to Castro may be an urgent appropriate next step.

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3. The following subjects are now the subject of planning:

a. The shape of a political settlement under the leadership of Henry Owen. He will be in touch with the bureaus and the Disarmament people.

b. Rules of engagement for a protracted war at sea: DOD and JCS.

c. Increased pressure on Cuba, including alternative means for taking out missiles and installations: DOD and JCS.

d. Clarification of doctrinal basis for our position: W. Jorden, working with P, L, and USIA.

4. In accordance with the President's instruction, Henry Owen, Mose Harvey, and I have begun work urgently on contingency track for a Summit meeting.

5. A general, interim appreciation of possible Soviet intentions will come forward this afternoon.

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DECLASSIFICATION DATE 6/10/77
 PER [Signature]
 FADRE FOI CASE NO. 62-284 [Signature]

October 24, 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/AM

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REVIEWED by [Signature] DATE 5/19/88
☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY in PART
☐ DENY ☐ Non-responsive info.
 FOI, EO or PA exemptions _____

TO: The Secretary
 Under Secretary
 G - Mr. Johnson

FROM: S/P - Walt W. Rostow () CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

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(b) The issue of taking out the missiles and installations already in Cuba increases in urgency. The Soviets may try to deflate the present crisis quickly and settle for what is in the island and what they can subsequently deliver by clandestine means. If we are going to act, we should consider acting very soon. Harry Rowen is in charge of work at the Pentagon on alternative methods. The Executive Committee may wish to review those alternative methods today.

(c) If the ships do turn back, a prompt, quiet approach to Castro may be an urgent appropriate next step.

3. The following subjects are now the subject of planning:

(a) The shape of a political settlement (strictly within the State Department) under the leadership of Henry Owen. He will be in touch with the bureaus and the Disarmament people.

(b) Rules of engagement for a protracted war at sea: BOD and JCS.

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(c) Increased

REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

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(c) Increased pressure on Cuba, including alternative means for taking out missiles and installations: DOD and JCS.

(d) Clarification of doctrinal basis for our position: w. Jordan, working with P, L, and U.K.

S/P: ~~Admiral~~

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